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In a recent paper [8], Owen extends the definition of the Banzhaf
index [1], [2] to non-simple games. He characterizes it in terms of the
multilinear extension of games, which permits an intriguing comparison
with the characterization of the Shapley value which he obtained in [7].
Here we will develop an axiomatic formulation of this index which
will permit comparisons to be made with the original formulation of the
Shapley value [12], with the recent interpretation of the Shapley value
as a cardinal utility [9], and with recent treatments of the Banzaf and
related indices for simple games [31, [5], [6], [10].
For a set of players N = {l,...,n}, a game in characteristic function
form is a real valued function on the subsets of N, such that v(4>) = 0.
For a given game v, a coalition T C N is a carrier if for all S C N,
v(S) « v(TOS). If n is a permutation of N, then for all S C N we denote
the image of S under it by nS, and define the game irv by rrv(iTS) = v(S)
.
2
For each player i e N the extended Banzhaf-Coleman index for a game
V is defined by .
(1) *^(v) = E T^TT [v(S) - v(S-i) ]
i e S
Thus for each player i in a game v, the extended Banzhaf-Coleman index
is a weighted sum of the contributions which player i makes to each coalition
of which he is a member.
The sum over all players of such contributions will be denoted by
T(v) = S Z [v(S) - v(S-i)]
i E N S
i e S
We will show that ^ » (tj/j^, . . .i() ) is the unique function f = (f^^
•"^n^
which satisfies the following conditions.
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Condition 1: (Symmetry) For each permutation it, f . (irv) = f (v) .
Condition 2: (Addltivity) For any games v and w, f(v+w) = f(v)+f(w).
Condition 3: For each carrier T of v, Z f (v) = T(v)
1 e T 2°"^
Theorem 1 : The extended Banzhaf-Coleman index Is the unique function
which satislfies conditions 1, 2, and 3.
For each R C N, we will find it convenient to consider games of the
form cv defined by cv (S) = 5c if RC s In general we will denote
CO otherwise.
the cardinality of sets R, S, T by r, s, t.
Lemma 1: If f obeys conditions 1 and 3, then
f. (cvj^) "jcll^'^ if 1 e R
Co if 1 ^ R
Proof: Suppose i ^ R. Then R and R L/i are both carriers of the game v , so
condition 3 implies f
.
(cv ) » 0, But if i, j e R, then condition 1 implies
T(cv ) ,n-r
f^(cv^) » f^(cv^). so for 1 . R. f^(cv^) = \ —^ -^' -
"^
2n-l 2^^-^
Proof c? theorem: Every game ^ is a sum of games of the form cv_. In
Si
fact (cf.[12]), we can write v = E c v where
RON ^ ^
(2) c_ = I (-l)''"''v(T).
^ TCR
Thus if f is a function which obeys conditions 1, 2, and 3, then Lemma 1
and condition 2 imply that f is given by
f (v) - Z fi(cRV ) - E c —
1 e R
.3
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So by equation (2) , we have
f,(v) = Z Z (-l)'''^v(T) -—-= 2 / I (-1)' -
_J^ j v(T)
^ RCNTCR 2 N R
1 e R I RZ^ifU i^
If we denote the term In parentheses by g (T) , then
(3) f^(v) = T ^ u gi(T)




( \ 1 coalitions R of size r such that R^ {lU i} , so
g (T) = E (-l)''-^ /n-t) —
^
^ r=t I r-t/ 2^" ^ •
Letting q = r-t and m = n-t we have
So by the binomial theorem.
Substituting this into equation (3), we see that it is the same as equation
(1) . Thus equation (1) gives the only function which might obey conditions
1, 2, and 3. It is easy to confirm that ^ obeys the conditions, which completes
the proof.
It should be noted that the conditions which determine the extended
Banzhaf-Coleman index are very similar to those which define the shapley value.
If the right hand side of condition 3 were changed from T(v)/2 to v(T)
,
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Thus both the Shap],ey value and the extended Banzhaf-Coleman index
obey condit: 3ns 1 and 2, and both a ^ weighted sums of the terms
[v(S) - v(S-i)]. Both fimctions also obey the following, weaker version
of condition 3.
Condition 3a: For any carriers T, S of v, E f
,





In general, we can state the following theorem.
Theorem 2: A function f = (f.,...,f ) obeys conditions 1, 2, and 3a
X n
if and only if
(4) f,(v) = E k.(t)[v(T) - v(T-i)]
^ TC N ^
ieT •
.
where k is a real valued function on t = l,...,n.
Proof: Clearly a function f given by equation (4) satisfies conditions
1 and 2. It also satisfies condition 3a, since if S is a carrier for v
and j ^ S, then f . (v> = 0. So 12 S is the minimum carrier of v, then
E f (v) ^ E .. f (v).
i e S i e S ... , , .
If f obeys condition-. 1, 2, and 3a then, following the proof of
Theorem 1, we see 'hat i^ (v ) depends only on r. So f can be written in
the form of equation v^) > where
k^(t) = I- (-i)''~^(r-Itl
^i^^'^ ^^^ ^i^^^ " ^i'^V ^""^ ^ ^ ^•
r=»t
A useful tool for examining other weighted suras is the multilinear
extension of a game, as defined in [7]. The multilinear extension of a
.e
,(v) 1 A « (v'» i S ,v
»£ bfif. ,S ,1 «o ( "J ^t) -^ 1 D
.)v - i'{
nj-
game v is defined on the unit cube o£ dimension n by
f(x ,...,x ) = E { n X n (1-x )}v(S).
^ " SCNleSi^S
Note that If (x,,...,x ) is a vector of zeroes and ones, then f(x) = v(S)
1 n
where i e S if and only if x. = 1.
Differentiating with respect to x , we have
f(x,...,x)= E { n X. n (1-x )}[v(S) - v(S-l)].
•^ " SCNjeS^jjfS ^
1 e S j f' 1
Owen observed in [8] that the extended Banzhaf-Coleman index is
obtained by evaluating the gradient of f at the point (4> . . • ,*s) • In fact,
we see that at every point the gradient of f is a weighted sum of
terms of the form [v(S) - v(S-i)]. So by Theorem 2, we have the following
result.
Corollary 1; The gradient of the multilinear extension of a game
everywhere satisfies conditions 1, 2, and 3a.
In [9] it was shown that the shapley value is a von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function, characterized by Lhe fact that ^.(v ) = — for i e R. It
X K IT
can be shown that every function f which satisfies conditions 1, 2, and 3a
is also a utility, characterized by the numbers f.(v„). The author hopes
i K
to explore this further in a subsequent article [11].

FOOTNOTES
1. The definitions given by Coleman in [4] are also closely related.
2. We use the term "extended" to denote the fact that the original definitions
of Banzhaf and Coleman applied only to simple games, while equation (1)
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